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Findings on Disarmament
WILLIAM 0. PETERFI
University of Minnesota, Morris
ABSTRACT - The author proposes a critical appraisal of current disarmament plans and their implications in present international affairs, especially, the 1964 draft treaties of the United States
and the Soviet Union calling for a general and complete disarmament. By comparing and evaluating these two plans, the author hopes to prove his thesis that although disarmament is part of
the overall peace effort, the attainment of disarmament will not necessarily establish peace. On
the contrary, before any actual and feasible disarmament can be achieved, there must be established a peaceful international climate conducive to a general and complete disarmament.

Part One

"To disarm or not to disarm," is the question that
might rightfully be asked by a latter day political scientist-, military expert-, statesman-, or just common manturned Hamlet. Of course, the original question posed by
the first Hamlet, "To be or not to be," is as relevant today as it was in the Shakespearean drama. Moreover, to
many people the two questions comprise the real issue
regarding the future of mankind: "If you do not disarm
you simply will not be." Others would develop this idea
to its logical conclusion by saying that mankind will not
survive unless peace is established throughout the world
and to establish peace the nations must disarm. Thus, the
argument goes, disarmament is an absolute prerequisite
to peace; there can be no peace without disarmament.
Whether or not this line of thinking is correct is discussed
in this paper.1
The scope of disarmament can be divided into two disThe author holds the Doctor of Law and Political Science
Degrees from Budapest University, 1950. Post-Doctoral Research Fellow in International Politics, Yale University, I 958-59.
Visiting Scholar in Politics, U.C.L.A., 1959-60. Visi ting Fellowin Politic.s, Princeton University, 1960-61. Between 1961-1965,
he held teaching assignments at various colleges; since September
1965, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University
of Minnesota, Morris; he is currently working on a book, entitled,
Peace Without Disarmament.
1
Because of the very extensive literature on di sarmament, no
attempt is made here to present even a limited bibliography.
However, the present paper reflects, among others, the contributions of the following writers : Raymond Aron , Neville Brown,
Richard A . Falk, Stanley Hoffman, Saul H. Mendlowitz, and
Walter Millis (on war and war prevention); David Frisch, Arthur Hadley, Morton H . Halperin, Louis Henkin, Thomas C .
Schelling (on various aspects of Disarmament); and John W.
Burton, Grenville Clark, Amitai Etzioni, and Louis B. Sohn ( on
the prospects of peace).

164

tin ct categories: first, general and complete or comprehensive disarmament; and second, limited arms reduction
or control. The first category would include disarmament
agreements involving all nations and all types of armaments; nations would be permitted only very limited arms
for the maintenance of internal order by internal security
forces. The other form of disarmament, limited in its
scope, would consist of attempts at local agreements between two or more nations and would include only partial armaments limitations.
In a general and complete disarmament plan, which
would be accomplished in various stages leading from
less to more drastic and radical measures, all nations
would adhere to a single treaty. General and complete
disarmament is based on the assumption that there is an
arms race which is general in its scope 2 among the present international community of major and lesser nations.
Thus, since nations do not live in isolation, a military
build-up in one country stimulates similar measures
among its neighbors, and even the neutra1 nations have
no choice but constantly to improve their military posture, and, as a consequence, to be drawn involuntarily
into the arms race. Since the neutral nations are not
members of military alliances, national self-interest and
survival is an individual concern . Most of the present
neutral nations have forces well beyond the level sufficient for the maintenance of internal peace and security.
It follows from this argument, therefore, that any disarmament argreement to which only a few states acceed, such
0
Ao excellent introduction to the study of disarmament and
arms control by Bull ( 1965), establishes a general terminology
of the various meanings of disarmament and arms control, and
offers a theoretical analysis of the subject matter. For practical
purposes, Professor Bull's terminology is used in the present pa~
per.
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as the various regional agreements, cannot stop the arms
race; nor can disarmament agreements that are limited to
only one category, such as nuclear weapons, naval, land,
or air forces, for each state will attempt to protect its own
national interest and security, and thus will embark upon
a weapon increase in the other military areas. In other
words, the agreed-upon limitations in one branch of arms
will alter the direction but not the pace of the armament
race (Bull, 1966: 271).
On the other hand, those who argue in favor of limited
arms control say that in the absence of an international
climate conducive to general and complete disarmament,
at least some limited reduction in arms should be introduced and pursued. It is submitted that general and complete disarmament under the present international conditions would be too big a risk, not only for the smaller nations but for the great powers as well. The lesser risk
connected with a limited arms control and reduction, it
is argued, would be more acceptable to all the nations of
the world. The advocates of limited arms control then
present a wide variety of proposals as first steps to a general and complete disarmament: international control of
atomic power; the reduction of conventional armaments
and armed forces; the so-called "open skies" proposal
for the prevention of surprise attack; the control of fissionable material; and nuclear weapons testing control.
During the some 130 meetings of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee extending over the past years, several
plans have been presented, discussed, and rejected by the
various participating powers .3 Only one plan has been
put into effect so far, the limited nuclear test ban treaty
between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963,
since joined by some one hundred other nations. This
treaty actually has no direct bearing upon disarmament
because it does not limit nuclear weapons in any way; it
only prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons and devices
in outer space and under water.
Part Two

The history of the disarmament movement since the
end of World War II can be divided into two periods; the
first period between 1946-1959, resulting in a variety of
limited arms control and reduction measures, and the
second period since 1959, which is characterized by demands for a general and complete disarmament (McVitty, 1964: I ) . The shifting emphasis from arms-control
measures to general and complete disarmament came in
the wake of the great pressure exerted by the lesser powers in the United Nations because of the fear of nuclear
proliferation, and culminated in a unanimous decision of
the General Assembly of 1959 calling upon governments
" Most of the disarmament plans have been submilted by the
United States and the Soviet Union. In addition, Great Britain,
France, and some of the unaligned powers contributed their own
proposals. The People's Republic of China made public their
plan for disarmament in 1963, well before their first nuclear
explosion. Besides the plans submitted by various governments,
there are also plans elaborated by private citizens and students
of international affairs, the most notable of which is the Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, "Draft Treaty for Establishing
World Disarmament" (Clark and Sohn, 1964).
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to "make every effort to achieve a constructive solution
of the problem of general and complete disarmament"
(United Nations, 1964:37). It was during this second
period that the so-called "Statement of Agreed Principles
For Disarmament Negotiations" (the McCloy-Zorin
Agreement of 1961) between the United States and the
Soviet Union set forth some general guidelines for a comprehensive disarmament treaty. 1 The establishment of
these "general principles" was the result of the previous
American and Russian limited disarmament and armscontrol plans. On the basis of the McCloy-Zorin agreement, both countries proceeded to formulate their own
draft treaties for general and complete disarmament. The
first plans of 1962 have been continuously modified, and
the latest proposals of 1964 form the basis of discussion
in the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Subcommittee at
the present. These two plans form the basis of my investigation of the whole complex problem of disarmament
here. By comparing the two draft treaty proposals, I will
attempt to unfold the basic issues and problems of a general and complete disarmament.
The justification of both the Russian and American
plans is the assumption that " war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems" (World Law
Fund, 1965: 1 and 29). 3 To carry out their objectives,
both plans call for an International Disarmament Organization (IDO) to work within the framework of the
United Nations and to be responsible for the execution
of the plans. The plans differ, however, on veto powers:
The Soviet plan provides for a veto by any permanent
member of the Security Council during the entire process
of disarmament. On the other hand, the American plan
would "ensure that the IDO and its inspectors would
have unrestricted access without veto to all places as
necessary for the purpose of effective verification"
(World Law Fund, 1965: 30). To this issue I will return
later. With regard to the time-table, the Russian proposal
calls for completing the entire process of disarmament in
a period of five years and in three different stages. The
American proposal, on the other hand, while agreeing to
a three-stage process does not have an overall timetable;
it has time limits for the first two stages but none for the
third , which would depend on the successful completion
of Stages I and II. Thus, the Soviet plan favors rapid disarmament on the ground that it might eliminate a period
during which violations of imbalances might occur between the participating nations whereas the American de1 These can be summarized in the following:
(a) Disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and ( b) That such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations. On the basis
of that the Statement calls for the elimination of armed forces,
conventional and nuclear and proposes stages for the implementation under strict and effective international control.
• The complete text of both the United States and the Soviet
Union plans are in Current Disarmament Proposals as of March
1, 1964, published by the World Law Fund, New York, 1965.
Whenever reference is made to either plan, the text will be
quoted from this source.
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sire for slower progress would be a kind of built-in guarantee against possible violations. The Russian plan calls
for an advance agreement to the total program and timetable that would not allow a halt in the process by any
nation claiming violation by others. The American plan,
to be able to avoid difficulties during the process, advocates the slow approach "by a sort of trial and error"
(McVitty, 1964:4).
Both plans agree on international inspection of the disarmament process through the IDO. However, the Soviet
plan would exempt from inspection all permissible armaments during the various stages. The American plan differs here from the Soviet counterpart insofar as it includes inspection of not only the armaments being reduced or abolished but those being retained during the
various stages as well.
The first stage under the Russian plan calls for the
"simultaneous elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and of all foreign military bases in alien
territories," the reduction of armed forces , conventional
armaments, production of arms, and military expenditures ( World Law Fund, l 965: 5) ; only an agreed upon
strictly limited number of nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles, and anti-missile missiles that are located exclusively in their own territory would be retained
by the United States and the Soviet Union until the end
of the third stage. The American plan proposes a 30 per
cent proportional cut in all types of weapons , both conventional and nuclear. In the American concept this approach would provide a greater safeguard for verification
of the disarmament process in its various stages than the
Russian plan.
In Stage II, the Russian plan calls for further decrease
in the military personnel (from 1,900,000 to 1,000,000
for each country) as well as in armaments and production. In addition, "the states parties to the treaty shall
undertake to effect the complete elimination of nuclear
and other weapons of mass destruction" within 24
months (World Law Fund, 1965: 15). The second stage
under the American plan would begin "upon the transition from Stage I and would be completed within three
years from that date" (World Law Fund, 1965: 46). An
additional reduction of 50 per cent of all remaining
armed forces and weapons after Stage I is proposed by
the U.S. plan, which would also include similar measures
for the production of armaments. With regard to nuclear
weapons, the American plan provides that the parties to
the treaty "would submit to the IDO a declaration stating
the amounts, types and nature of utilization of all their
fissionable materials" (World Law Fund, 1965: 49).
These fissionable materials would then be reduced to
"minimum levels on the basis of agreed percentage"
( World Law Fund, 1965: 49). While the Soviet plan
calls for the elimination of foreign bases in Stage I , the
United States proposes the dismantling and conversion
to "peaceful uses" of certain agreed military bases and
facilities, only in Stage IL Finally, the U.S. plan would
establish a United Nations Peace Force within the first
year of Stage II, after verification of Stage I had success166

fully been concluded. The Soviet plan provides for a
similar establishment oniy during Stage III. Moreover, it
actually would not be a separate force but would be
made up from the so-called "police units" of the states
that would be made available to the Security Council. On
this issue there is again a great difference between the
two proposals. The argument behind the U.S. approach
is that there is no need for police force in Stage I because
the nations would each retain enough power to defend
themselves against any breach in the disarmament process The U.S. proposal would begin to build up this police force during Stage II so that in Stage Ill it would
emerge strong enough to possess "sufficient Armed
forces and armaments so that no state could challenge
it" (World Law Fund, 1965: 57). The Soviet proposal
would build this police force on the basis of "national
contingents" that would remain under the command of
their respective military authorities. In Stage Ill, when
they would be put at the disposal of the Security Council,
the units' command would be "composed of representatives of the three principal groups or states existing in
the world on the basis of equal representation" (World
Law Fund, 1965: 24-25). The use of a veto by any permanent member of the Security Council would obviously
prevent the successful operation of this kind of UN
Force as it is envisaged by the Soviet plan.
Other features of Stage Ill of the Russian proposal
are complete elimination of the remaining armed forces,
conventional armaments, military production, military
establishments, and military conscription and training,
complete destruction of the nuclear weapons and means
of delivery that had been provided for in Stage I. As a
consequence, the nations would retain only the so-called
police force (militia) equipped with light firearms on a
proportional basis as prescribed in the treaty.
The American Stage III is similar to the Soviet's with
regard to the elimination of the remaining nuclear and
conventional armaments, military personnel, and production, but it also calls for the complete dismantling of the
remaining military bases.
On the important question of financing inspection and
control by the IDO during the three stages, there seems
to be no great difference between the two plans. It would
be financed proportionately by all participating nations.
The sole difference is that the Soviet plan calls for an advance assessment of the scale of payments by the nations
whereas the American plan would allow the lDO nations
to determine the scale.
The amending process of the plans further illuminates
the difference between them. According to the Russians,
any amendment would require a two-thirds majority of
the Conference, which is the larger body of the IDO
comprising all states to the treaty and includes the permanent members of the Security Council. The United States
would leave determination of the amending process until
after the treaty had come into force and when the parties
" would agree to specific procedures for considering
amendments or modifications of the treaty" (World Law
Fund, 1965: 58). Throughout the various stages, the
The Minnesota Academy of Science

U.S. plan provides that any differences in the interpretation of their treaty proposal be subject to referral to the
International Court of Justice.
Part Three

Both plans, it appears, leave unsolved three major
problems, all of which must be solved if disarmament is
to be a success: first, the difficulty of having all nations
acceed voluntarily to a disarmament plan; second, the
lack of a necessary guarantee of security to all nations
during the various stages of actual disarmament; and,
third, the overall problem of the nature of a disarmed
and warless world. On all three of these issues, neither
plan offers convincing and satisfactory approaches and
guarantees. 0
Both disarmament proposals provide for a mechanism,
the International Disarmament Organization (IDO), that
would become a part of the United Nations, and would
include as its members all the participating nations. In
the Russian plan, this membership feature is necessary
because the treaty, before going into effect, must be
agreed upon and ratified by all participants. In the American plan, membership would become a requirement only
in Stage II and could not be undertaken until " all militarily significant states had become parties to the treaty"
(World Law Fund, 1965: 29) .7
Of course, not all nations of the world are presently
members of the United Nations, and this fact alone suggests the enormity of the first problem. Since, according
to both plans the principles of the UN Charter would be
applicable, those nations denied membership will not be
wiiling to adhere to any disarmament plan unless admitted to UN membership and allowed to participate in the
preparation of the final draft. Consequently, a draft treaty
prepared and adopted by all present member nations of
the UN would have to be modified to be acceptable to
those nations which are not members.' The provisions of
the present draft treaties inviting all nations to join will
probably be unsatisfactory to those which have had no
influence in preparing it. Thus, the first step in disarmament should start with the reorganization of the present
United Nations." All the nations of the world should be
• Marion McVitty reached similar co nclusions in her evaluation of the two plans by proclaiming th at "the disparity between
the two official disarmament plans is less important than the
mutual fail ure of the two governments to complete them" (McVitty, 1965: 40). What makes both plans unacceptable and unworkable is basically the lack of provisions for the definiteness
of the state of affairs in the international community of nations
in a so-called "disarmed and warless world ."
'Neither plan identifies what is meant by "militaril y signi fi cant states."
• Hedley Bull objects to the present bilateral approach of disarmament negotiations and proposals between the United States
and the Soviet Union. He argues that if, for example, France
and The P eople's Republic of China would participate in disarmament discussions it would perhaps be easie r to achieve
progress ( Bull, I 965: xxxviii-xxxix).
'John W. Burton in his Peace Th eory-Preconditions of Disannmmmt, questions the whole concept of the UN, by proclaiming that the Chart er "does not reflec t the concept of peace," because it proposes the elimination of war through the peaceful
settlements of disputes and provides collective actio n against
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admitted to UN membership. The problems of the People's Republic of China and the divided nations of Germany, Korea, and Vietnam should be settled. 1 u Clearly,
any disarmament plan would present unsurmountable
ditnculties if these nations did not participate in the preparation of it. Under both of the present plans, the 1DO
will be responsible for the execution of the disarmament
process. Thus, all nations participating in disarmament
will have to become members of it. The IDO is supposed
to be put under the control of the United Nations and if
states presently non-members of the UN would join in
general and complete disarmament, a conflict of interest
might very well arise out of the membership in the 1DO
and non-membership in the UN.
Another problem arises out of the absolute control
through the veto power, of the Permanent Members of
the present Security Council. It is very likely that unless
this veto power is abolished, the middle and lesser powers of the world will be reluctant to trust their future to
the good will of the super-powers. The American suggestion of a two-thirds majority rule in all stages of the disarmament process would more likely be acceptable to
these powers, Also, the U.S. proposal for the settlement
of disputes by the International Court of Justice would
increase the feeling of security of the lesser participating
powers. But the vagueness in design and the basic differences in approach in the two plans with regard to admission of states to the IDO makes both plans totally inadequate even before actual disarmament could be attempted.
Now, even assuming that the membership and veto
problems have been eliminated by a more realistic approach acceptable to the United States and the Soviet
Union, there still remains a second problem, the supervision of the various Stages and the guarantees against
possible violators. Perhaps one of the greatest problems
of any disarmament plan will be the question of the detection of violations and the punishment of violators at
any given step of disarmament. 11 Both plans agree on
strict inspection and "enforcement" of the entire disarmament process; nevertheless, the ways and means of detecting a violation and determining punishment differ so
profoundly as to make both systems wholly unworkable_
aggression, "both of which presuppose as inevitable a state of
circumstances in which there cannot be a condition of peace."
Burton, I 962: 131.
Among the many critics of the United Nations advocating a
general reorgani zation of the UN, the contributions of Clark and
Sohn are outstanding. The importance of the reorganization of
the U nited Nations and the inclusion of all nat ions which are
presently outside of the UN is being proposed as a first step
in the establishment of peaceful international cooperation among
nations by Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn in their major
work: World Peace Through World Law.
10
A short, very thought fu l, analysis of the implications of
China, especially since her nuclea r capability, is fo und in Arthur S. LaJl's article, "The Political Effects of the Chinese Bomb,"
in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1965: 21-24.
The general aspects of China in contemporary world affa irs are
discussed by Morton H alperi n in his China and th e Bomb.
11
A profound analysis of the problem of control is presented
in the standard study on Strategy and Arms Control, by Thomas
C. Schelli ng and Morton Halperin.
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If any nation would succeed in evading the fulfillment of
any part of disarmament, this could lead to the overthrow of the existing balance between the nations. As
Arthur T . Hadley pointed out:
Since the critical function of arms control is first to
stabilize the balance of terror and then to reduce
the elements in the balance itse lf, current arms control and disarmament proposals can be examined to
see whether they contribute to this goal. The question is not, Does an arms control plan effectively
"disarm" a nation? but, Does it make all-out war less
likely, or reduce the destructiveness of any war that
might occur? If it does not, or if it leaves the situation
basically unchanged , the plan is neither in the national nor in the world interest. ( Hadley, 1965: 72)

As mentioned above, according to the U.S. plan any detected violation would bring that particular stage to a
complete halt while the violation remains uncorrected.
It appears that under the U.S. plan, the only means for
the correction of a deliberate violation would be the
force of world opinion. In the Russian plan, depending
upon the nature of the violation and the sta,te involved,
action could be taken or prevented by the use of the veto. Thus, the abrogation of the draft treaty at any stage
by any major nation would probably stop the disarmament process and lead to a renewal of the arms race.
A common feature of both disarmament proposals is
the very vague and negative character of the so-called
disarmed and warless world. If the Soviet draft treaty is
carried out, no nation would be able to wage war and the
relations among nations would be completely controlled
by the United Nations. However, the plan does not provide any concrete means for the solution of international
disputes which might arise after the attainment of general
and complete disarmament. War, as a means of national
policy, would be outlawed and all disputes would have
to be settled peacefully in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations. A police forc e, established by the
IDO and controlled by the Security Council, would maintain international peace and security. However, the Russian concept of international police force, based upon the
national police forces (militia) and controlled by the
three groups of nations, the East, the West, and the Unaligned Bloc, would obviously render this 1D0 force
inoperative. The international police force proposed by
the United States docs not seem much better in this respect. The U.S. draft treaty calls for an independent international police force under the United Nations which
would have real power after the completion of disarmament. This force could be used any time whenever the
United Nations members and the Security Council so decide. However, as long as the veto remains, its use would
be very limited, if not impossible indeed.
The peaceful settlement of international disputes in a
disarmed world would remain unsolved (Hedley, 1961:
73-77) . It appears that the conduct of international affairs would in a way be built upon a "balance of national
power" rather than based upon "enforceable world law"
(McVitty, 1965: 34). Both plans would thus continue
the old pre-disarmament international system of the bal-
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ance of power, mutual deterrence, and sovereignty of nations. If there is no basic change in the international system, the states will have no reasons to change their attitudes toward it either. In the absence of a definite and
workable new system the compliance of nations to the
new requirement will rest on the old proven principles of
national self-determination and self help. It appears to
me that both the United States and the Soviet Union are
in a way proposing old cures to old maladies (Millis and
Real , 1963: 195-196). However, a word of caution is
due here, especially with regard to the Soviet proposal.
Speaking of the Russian approach to the security of nations in a disarmed world, a Soviet expert, G. Andreyev,
writing in the Moscow published International Affairs,
offers the following assurances to all nations:
The very principle of settling the disarmament issue
precludes (italics mine) the possibility of advantages
and privileges to anyone. Once all states disarm,
once not a single state has a war machine at its
disposal, this will preclude any possibility of threatening the security of any state or group of states (Andreyev, 1961, 6: 7).

In the defense of their plan, the Soviets spare no efforts in letting the world know that "to abolish war and
establish everlasting peace on earth is a historic mission
of Communism" (lnozemtsev, 1961, 11: 15) . As a matter of a fact, another Soviet writer, in accordance with
the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, gives a very simplified
analysis of the causes of war and the reasons leading to
peace:
The only source of a war threat today is imperialism . The states of the Socialist communi ty, the
peoples of the neutralist countries and the working
people in the imperialist states themselves strive to
counteract the latter's inherent tendency to give rise
to wars. The balance between the forces of war and
of peace now makes it very difficult to start a world
war and decreases the probability of other types of
wars being launched . As imperialism becomes weaker and the influence of tbe world Socialist system
on international relations increases, the possibility
of armed outbreaks occurring will steadily decrease.
This makes the task of excluding world war from society a feasible one even before the complete victory
of Socialism has been achieved and despite the preservation of capitalism in part of the world. With the
victory of Socialism all over the world , the social
and national reasons for starting wars of any type
will finally be eliminated (Galkin, 1961, 11: 29).

If this above statement has any bearing upon the question of disarmament, it is its conclusion which clearly
contradicts the Soviet plan for general and complete
disarmament in admitting that wars will actually not end
after disarmament but only after the victory of Socialism
"all over the world. " But if that is the Soviet belief then
disarmament, at least from the point of view of the nonSocialist countries becomes remote indeed. The ideological differences between the West and East appear to
be too wide to dispel the basic mistrust between the two
groups of nations.
In conclusion, then, the reasons why the present U.S.
The Minnesota Academy of Science

and USSR disarmament proposals are inadequate to
achieve their proposed goal might be summarized as follows. First of all, because of the ideological split among
them the present division among nations would not disappear in a disarmed world. The Soviet system of disarmament takes full cognizance of this fact by providing
equal joint control of the international police force by
the Unaligned, the Western and the Eastern bloc of nations. In this regard, the Russian concept is much more
realistic than the American plan, which does not want to
recognize such basic divisions of the world. But these
very divisions preclude a workable agreement. Thus, as
a first pre-disarmament move, the creation of an international climate conducive to disarmament is essential. The
present pending issues, such as the German Peace Treaty,
the divided nations, the reorganization of the United Nations, the admission of all nations to the UN, the veto in
the Security Council, nuclear testing, the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, overpopulation, economic aid to underdeveloped nations, technological sharing and the opposing military alliances in the world must be solved before
any serious attempt at disarmament can be made. The
present concepts of the nations-state system, sovereignty,
and national self-determination of nations, must be reappraised and the rule of law in international relations established.
In the final analysis peaceful cooperation among nations can be established only if the nations really want to
disarm and live in peace with each other. If the Soviet
Union and the United States cannot reach an agreement
on the admission of the People's Republic of China now,
if they are not capable nor willing to agree on a peace
treaty with Germany, it seems absurd to envision the
feasibility of an even more difficult general and complete
disarmament and peaceful cooperation among nations
afterwards.
As the two mightiest nations of the world, the United
States and the Soviet Union should take the lead in the
establishment of a world without fear and suspicion. If
these two nations could eliminate the presently existing
mistrust towards each other and propose feasible solutions of the outstanding issues of international politics,
the confidence of the lesser nations in their leadership
and sincerity could become a most valuable down-payment to an eventual general and complete disarmament.
References

ANDREYEV, G. 1961. Disarmament Talks: Truth and
Fiction. International Affairs (Moscow), 6: 3-14.
ARON R. 1954. The Century of Total War. Boston, Beacon Press.
BROWN, N. 1964. Nuclear War. The Impending Strategic
Deadlock. New York, Frederick A. Praeger.
Bun, H. 1965. The Control of the Arms Race. New
York, Frederick A. Praeger.
Bun, H. 1966: 270-277. General and Comprehensive

Journal of, Volume Thirty-four, No. 2, 1967

Disarmament. In Falk, R. A. and Mendlowitz, S. H.,
Editors. Disarmament and Economic Development.
New York, World Law Fund.
BURTON, J. W. 1961. Peace Theory. Preconditions of
Disarmament. New York, Alfred A. Knopf.
CLARK, G. and SOHN, L.B. 1964. World Peace Through
World Law. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
DULLES, E. L. and CRANE, R. D. Editors. 1965. Detante. Cold War Strategies in Transition. New York,
Frederick A. Praeger.
ETZIONI, A. 1962. The Hard Way To Peace. New York,
Collier Books.
FALK, R. A. and MENDLOWITZ, s. H. 1966. Editors. Disarmament and Economic Development. New York,
World Law Fund.
FALK, R. A. and MENDLOWITZ, s. H. 1966. Editors.
Toward a Theory of War Prevention. New York,
World Law Fund.
FRISCH, D. H. 1961. Arms Reduction. Program and Issues. New York, The Twentieth Century Fund.
GALKIN, A. 1961. Some Aspects of the Problem of Peace
and War. International Affairs (Moscow), 11: 2935.
HADLEY, A. 1961. The Nation's Safety and Arms Control. New York, The Viking Press.
HALPERIN, M. 1965. China and the Bomb. New York,
Frederick A. Praeger.
HENKIN, L. 1961. Editor. Arms Control. Issues for the
Public. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc.
INOZEMTSEV, N. 1961. Results and Prospects of the Development of International Relations. International Affairs (Moscow), 11: 15-21.
KAHN, H. 1960. On Thermonuclear War. Princeton,
Princeton University Press.
KAHN, H. 1965. On Escalation. Metaphors and Scenarios. New York, Frederick A. Praeger.
KISSINGER, H. A. 1960. The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy. New York, Harper.
LALL, A. S. 1965. The Political Effects of the Chinese
Bomb. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February:
21-24.
MELMAN, S. 1962. The Peace Race. New York, George
Braziller.
McVITTY, M. H. 1964. A Comparison and Evaluation
of Current Disarmament Proposals. New York, World
Law Fund.
MILLIS, W. and REAL, J. 1963. The Abolition of War.
New York, The Macmillan Company.
SCHELLING, T. C. 1960. The Strategy of Con,flict. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
SCHELLING, T. C. and HALPERIN, M. H. 1961. Strategy
and Arms Control. New York, The Twentieth Century
Fund.
World Law Fund. 1965. Current Disarmament Proposals. New York, World Law Fund.

169

